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TACTICAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
IN THE 1990s

Lt Colonel Gerald L. Fjetland
Chief, System Engineering
Advanced Space Communications Program
USAF Space Division

service. Fortunately, there are frequency
bands allocated to military satellite
communications (MILSATCOM) that can
overcome the frequency crowding and
difficulties with interference and, at the
same time provide a new level of mobility
and flexibility to the communications
equipment for the combat forces.U) These
frequency bands are in the vicinity of 20,
30 and 44 GHZ and are commonly referred to
as the EHF MILSATCOM bands. The 20 GHZ
band, actually in the upper range of the
SHF frequencies, is allocated for downlink
service and the 30 and 44 GHZ bands are
allocated for uplink service. In this
paper we will investigate the enhanced
operational effectiveness of combat forces
through the use of modern satellite
communications, review the evolution of
the architecture for MILSATCOM systems,
and discuss the motivation for a move to
the EHF bands. We will then discuss the
technology needed for such a move and the
status of that technology development.
Finally, we will discuss the tasks which
lie ahead of us in defining the detailed
requirements for tactical satellite
communications, securing agreement to
those requirements among the services, and
obtaining the resources necessary to
pursue the development of a tactical
satellite communications system.

ABSTRACT

The rapid advancements in electronic
technology over the past few years
indicate both the need for vastly improved
communications capability and the means to
provide that capability. Use of the EHF
frequency bands allocated for satellite
communications and the development of
signal processing capability for
communications satellites will allow the
next generation of military communications
satellites to overcome the capacity and
interference resistance limitations of
todays systems. These improvements will
also allow the use of small, highly mobile
earth terminals, a capability that is
highly significant to the combat forces.
INTRODUCTION

Today we have the most sophisticated and
capable military command and control
communications systems the world has ever
seen. Military commanders can receive
information from, and send direction to,
widely dispersed forces through a variety
of media under almost any condition. As
capable and sophisticated as todays
systems are, they are rapidly becoming
obsolete, the explosion of the capability
to gather and process information has put
a huge strain on the communications
systems needed to transfer that
information. The frequency bands in use
today are becoming increasingly crowded
and the capability of an enemy to
effectively jam these bands is growing.
There is little that can be done to
mitigate these problems for terrestrial
communication systems, especially those
systems that provide beyond line of sight

ENHANCED OPERATIONAL
MILSATCOM

The function of a communications
Is
to provide a means for the flow of
information and direction to and
a
decision maker* In the military, the'unit
commander is the decision maker* The
communications system handles
status information and
echelons and outgoing orders and
reports to higher echelons. The
of
orders is "downward"; the flow of
status reports is "upward 11 ;; and the
of Incoming status
Is
all
directions.
Is
if
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it is in the hands of the decision maker.
Information that is extraneous to the
decision being taken will only delay the
decision and can be viewed as noise in the
system. Information in a useable form
must be in the proper hands in sufficient
time for a decision to be taken and orders
distributed to exploit the information.
This exploitation of "real time 11
information can be viewed as a three step
process:
(1) locate targets with sufficient
accuracy to fall within the engagement
envelope of friendly forces.
(2) provide target information to a
decision maker in a usable form.
(3) provide orders to friendly
forces before targets have left their
engagement envelopes.
This process requires effective
communications between a sensor and a data
processing facility; between the data
processing facility and the decision maker
(commander): and between the commander and
his forces.\2) if we view the whole
process as a feedback control system we
can see that there is an absolute
dependence upon effective
communications to make the system Work.
The required characteristics for effective
command and control systems include
several that are inherent to a modern
satellite communications system; these
are: availability, mobility, timeliness,
jam resistance, flexibility and
survivabilityJ 3 / The MILSATCOM systems
of today have orbital parameters that
ensure communications availability
anywhere in the world. The frequencies
by MILSATCOM systems tend to minimize
the effects of ionospheric disturbances
allowing communications day or night any
time of the year. Projected future
MILSATCOM systems will even further reduce
the propagation losses. As these systems
into the higher frequency bands.

smaller earth terminals become possible,
increasing mobility. The proposed
tactical satellite communications system
will include the ability to interconnect
earth terminals operating in different
frequency bands - a feature that will
significantly enhance operational
flexibility. The combination of world
wide coverage and highly mobile earth
terminals allows the timely establishment
of communications with any trouble spot.
The increased bandwidth available at the
higher frequencies allows the
incorporation of techniques to negate the
effectiveness of enemy jamming attempts.
Finally, the location of communications
satellites more than 35,000 kilometers out
in space provides a level of physical
survivability not found in terrestrial
communications systems. These features,
in combination, lead to communications
capabilities that can provide extremely
effective command and control of our
military forces.
There are many approaches to the
measurement of the effectiveness of
improved command and control capabilities.
Effectiveness can be measured in terms of
weapons saved, lives saved, objectives
obtained and so on. These measurements
must be qualitative rather than
quantitative. We can only estimate the
resources required to attain an objective
with, and without a particular command and
control system. For example, we can
estimate the number of weapons saved if we
can redirect second strike sorties once
confirmation of successful first strike is
attained. We can improve the accuracy of
the estimate through the use of computer
simulation of the scenario with, and
without, communications for redirection.
But we can never experience the
alternative not adopted. We can look at
history and point out the successful
operations that had effective command and
control and the failures that did not.
(When we are advocating effective command
and control we obviously do not point out

the successful operations that did not
have it or the failures that did).
The American soldier has enjoyed the
reputation of an independent thinker
capable of innovative approaches to
unforeseen problems. This reputation is
partially the result of the "citizen
soldier" concept wherein the bulk of the
fighting force is drawn from the ranks of
a democratic society that highly values
self reliance. Another important factor
in this reputation is the historical
ability to operate with minimum
information because of a clear logistics
superiority. When Japanese General
Yamashita was asked to rate the Americans
as jungle fighters he is reported to have
replied "They are not jungle fightersfirst they shoot away the jungle, and then
they fight". Americans have long enjoyed
the ability to use massive fire power to
achieve military objectives. From carpet
bombing by B-17s in Europe to air strikes
on sniper positions in Viet-Nam, the
philosophy was to heavily strike an area
occupied by the enemy, even when specific
targets could not be identified. Today
that philosophy cannot be followed. The
logistics superiority we once enjoyed
simply no longer exists.(*)
In recent years we have moved to replace
our superiority in fire power with a
superiority in command and control
systems. Reconnaissance by fire is being
replaced with a variety of new and
sophisticated sensor systems that can
locate and identify targets in almost any
environment. One drawback to this new
situation is lack of acceptance by field
commanders. No one likes to be dependent
on resources beyond his control; yet
maneuver elements cannnot be encumbered
with large and delicate data processing
centers. The problem becomes one of
education. First, the distinction between
data and information must be drawn.(5)
Then the field commanders must be led to
understand that systems that reduce data

445

and provide information are not making
decisions for them; but rather are merely
providing the basis for rational decision
making.
Once battlefield acceptance of remote data
processing is obtained, a new realm of
operational effectiveness can be entered.
Mobile units will no longer depend upon
fixed or cumbersome command and control
assets. Prepositioned communications for
command and control will be unnecessary.
With satellite communications, effective
command and control of forward elements of
units, such as the Rapid Deployment Force,
can be accomplished by a CONUS battle
staff until forward command elements can
be established. The danger lies in
allowing a drift from adequate control to
overcontrol. The degree of control that
is correct varies with the situation. The
Mayaguez rescue benefitted from real time
control from the Pentagon. The Israeli
staff only monitored the communications
among elements of the Entebbe rescue.(6)
A delicate balance must be maintained
between providing: too
and
providing too little control. TOG*
"help 11 from hinher hp^dnn^rfprc 15 viewed
from the f'.ciu a,> rrr'.cr-. • -:-. ^g^v-it or
worse. The day to dc/ •::•--.visions
be
made by the field commanders. The
of the command and control
is to
provide adequate information
which .to
base a decision. Then the
a field cor~a~d::r must be
After the tal i of Tobruk it was the
obvious choice for
to*
destroy the fleeing British - from
Rommel's point of view. This decision
should have be?-~ jverruled fas Kesselring
attempted) until me German position in
the Eastern Mediterranean was secured by
taking Malta.
The examples are endless* For every Jack
D. Ripper running out of control there is
a. Charles Forbin trying to centralize all
decision making.'?) The comrnu.nl cat ions

system provides the ability to give
information and direction. Its proper use
or abuse is a problem the design engineer
cannot solve.
Satellite communications can enhance
military operations in several other
areas. Once the battlefield commanders
have accepted the concept of a data
reduction center that is not under their
direct control, then such a center can be
located at great distances from the sensor
systems and command elements it supports.
The remote location will greatly enhance
the survivability of the data reduction
center by removing it from the enemy's
engagement envelope and release combat
elements that would otherwise be dedicated
to its defense. Communications with long
range aircraft and naval units at sea
require long range, reliable jam resistant
communications that can be provided only
by satellites. Modern satellite
communciations systems also provide an
effective means of maintaining contact
with special military operations. The
combination of small antenna size and
narrow beam pattern achievable at the EHF
frequency band allows communications with
units, such as Airlift Combat Control
Teams operating in enemy territory,
without detection by enemy forces.
THE EVOLUTION OF MILSATCOM ARCHITECTURE

For the last several years the military
services have been pursuing a MILSATCOM
architecture consisting of three segments
based upon the unique requirements of
three user communities. The first segment
provides communications for the nuclear
capable forces who need the highest degree
of physical survivability, ability to
operate in an intense jamming environment,
and world wide coverage with high
availability. Most of the communications
needs of the nuclear capable community can
be satisfied with low data rate (75 baud)
service. The second segment serves the
wideband trunking community. This

community includes the Defense
Communications System,the Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service and other users
characterized by high data rates and large
fixed earth terminals. We use the term
Earth Terminal to identify the terrestrial
end of a satellite to earth communications
link. The third segment of the MILSATCOM
architecture provides
service to the Tactical/Mobile user
community. This community requires world
wide coverage, the ability to operate in
an intense jamming environment, often very
close to the source of jamming, and low to
medium data rates, typically voice grade
service from small mobile or transportable
earth terminals.
Today, the nuclear capable forces are
served by the Air Force Satellite
Communications System (AFSATCOM). The
AFSATCOM space segment consists of
dedicated Air Force UHF channels on the
Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM)
satellite and transponders on other host
spacecraft. Earth terminals are installed
on SAC bombers, missile launch control
centers, airborne and ground command posts
and Navy radio relay aircraft.
The wide band trunking community is
presently served by Phase II of the
Defense Satellite Communications System
(DSCS - II) which provides SHF Satcom
service to a world wide network of fixed
earth terminals under the management of
the Defense Communication Agency (DCA).
The FLTSATCOM system currently serves the
tactical/mobile community. The FLTSATCOM
satellite provides fleet broadcast and
fleet relay service as well as the
AFSATCOM service previously mentioned.
The fleet broadcast channel uses an SHF
uplink; the remaining channels are UHF.
Earth terminals are located on ships and
aircraft of the fleet, mobile platforms
such as trucks and jeeps and even back
pack radios.
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The three segment MILSATCOM architecture
included a near term follow-on system for
each segment of the architecture.
AFSATCOM was to be followed by the
Strategic Satellite System; DSCS II by
DSCS III; and FLTSATCOM by a leased UHF
system known as LEASAT. The far term
included an improved Strategic Satellite
System, an upgrade to DSCS III or a DSCS
IV and a new tactical satellite
communication system called TACSATCOM II.

Last October representatives from the
military services and the Defense
Communications Agency, under the direction
of Doctor Van Trees, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(communications, command, control and
intelligence), initiated an intensive
revaluation of the MILSATCOM
architecture. The prime goal of this
effort was to develop an architure that
would be responsive to the needs of the
military and acceptable to Congress. This
goal can be met by developing the concept
of truly a joint mission satellite. A
satellite communications architecture
based on satellites with mixed user groups
can effectively indicate a unified DOD
that strives for the cooperative
exploitation of space.

The three segment architecture began to
run into trouble in the summer of 1979
when Congress deleted funds for the
development of the Strategic Satellite
System space segment, a new satellite
intended to operate in polar orbits at
super synchronous altitudes. At the same
time the services were continuing their
planning for the development of TACSATCOMII. The TACSATCOM II planning was
fragmented and discordant as each service
concentrated on its own needs. Little
consideration was given to the development
of operational concepts explaining the
role of satellite communications in the
command and control of combat forces and
the needs of joint forces were given
practically no consideration.

After an extensive review of the
requirements of each user community, it
became apparent that there is a great deal
of similarity in the needs of the nuclear
capable forces and the tactical/mobile
forces. Both user groups require world
wide communications among small, highly
mobile earth terminals. Both user groups
need to operate in an intense jamming
environment. Both user groups operate at
voice rate and slower data rates. The
basic elements of functional commonality
of these communities has led to the
consideration of a two segment
architecture for the long term follow-on
to the existing and programmed MILSATCOM
systems. The two segment architecture
will provide service to the wide band
trunking user'community just as was
planned in the three segment architecture.
The nuclear capable and the
tactical/mobile communities will be served
by a new tactical communication satellite
(we use tactical here in the broader sense
of the word—supporting the maneuver
elements). The remainder of this paper
will focus on the tactical segment.
Details of the new two segment MILSATCOM1
architecture have yet to be fully
developed. We expect that the concept of

Over the next year much attention was
given to the strengthening of the case for
the Strategic Satellite System. The
planning for TACSATCOM II also began to
take shape as the differences between the
services were resolved. However, Congress
was still not convinced and the funds for
the Strategic Satellite System space
segment were again deleted. Now the
services were faced with a new problem.
The time phasing of the two developments
with the TACSATCOM development following
the strategic satellite development could
no longer be followed if the operational
need date were to be met. It was clear
that another look at the MILSATCOM
architecture was warranted.
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a joint mission satellite will lead to a
generic communications satellite. A
family of common, shuttle compatible
spacecraft with joint communications
payload electronics is feasible.
Regardless of the orbital scheme to be
pursued, a common payload design is
practical. The only differences between
spacecraft would be those dictated by the
pecularities of the orbit selected.

can pursue new, more efficient modulation
techniques, applicable to all users and a
standard building block set of earth
terminal modules.(8)
The precise antenna patterns achievable at
EHF, even with relatively small antennas,
is another advantage of these frequencies.
The narrow beamwidths that can be obtained
help make an EHF system more covert. This
covertness will allow communications to
take place with units operating behind
enemy lines and in other situations where
they previously had to maintain radio
silence to avoid detection. The precise
patterns available also allow a reasonable
sized spacecraft antenna to steer antenna
nulls in the directon of interference
sources further reducing the effectiveness
of jamming attempts. To effectively
accomplish this at UHF or SHF in a
tactical scenario would require
impractically large antenna arrays in
space. The advantages of EHF do not come without
cost. The EHF frequencies are affected by
propagation losses, particularly at the
higher frequencies, due to rain. These
losses can be overcome by power, but more
power is expensive—especially on
spacecraft. The spacecraft power question
is a prime reason for selecting a lower
frequency (20GHZ ) for the downlink.
Electron devices tend to be less efficient
at EHF frequencies further aggravating the
power/cost problem and adding a heat
dissipation problem where none previously
existed. These problems present some
engineering challenges but they can be
solved. The advantages of EHF in a combat
environment far outweigh the
disadvantages.
Other features are needed of a future
tactical communications satellite if full
advantage of the EHF frequency is to be
taken. One of these is on-board
processing to the base band level. This
means that the satellite will despread,
demodulate and decode the uplink signal;

We also expect the membership in the
tactical user community will expand beyond
the combined membership of the nuclear
capable and tactical/mobile communities of
the old three segment architecture. The
tactical MILSATCOM system should serve, in
addition to the current AFSATCOM and
FLTSATCOM users, some elements of the
Defense Communications System, the Rapid
Deployment Force, the Ground Mobile
Forces, and any other users who need a
robust communications capability among
small mobile platforms.
THE CASE FOR EHF

While many of the features of the next
generation MILSATCOM system remain
uncertain, one is becoming increasingly
clear. The MILSATCOM system for tactical
communications in the 1990.'s will include
susbstantial capacity in the EHF bands.
There are several advantages of EHF over
the UHF and SHF bands now in use. Perhaps
the most important of these is the wide
bandwidths available in the allocated EHF
bands. These bandwidths are available for
increased capacity as well as spectrum
spreading techniques for interference
resistance. Unlike the UHF and SHF bands
which are crowded with terrestrial users
the EHF bands are not presently occupied.
Systems operating in the EHF bands also
offer the advantage of small high gain
antennas and correspondingly small earth
terminals—a factor that is particularly
important to tomorrow's highly mobile
tactical forces. Because there are no
existing entrenched systems to satisfy, we
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direct the signal to the appropriate
downlink channel; and then reencode,
remodulate and respread the signal into a
format compatible with the equipment at
the message address. This places the
downlink power in signal transmission
rather than wasting downlink power by
retransmitting system interference.

communications system suitable for high
data rate crosslinks has been developed
and tested. In air to ground tests,
operating in an environment much more
severe than would be expected of a
crosslink, the LASER communication system
demonstrated a Giga bit per second
bits per second) data rate with a bit
error rate of less than one per million.
Satellite communications systems installed
in large aircraft have been operational
for several years and, in 1978, the
feasibility of satellite communications
with fighter aircraft was demonstrated
using a B-52 AFSATCOM terminal installed
in an RF-4C. Thus, all of the concepts for
the new generation MILSATCOM system have
been demonstrated. The specific items of
hardware needed to implement those
concepts are now under development.

Another feature of the next generation
tactical communications satellite system
is the use of satellite-to-satellite
crosslinks to.avoid the need for multiple
hop relays. This feature will allow any
earth terminal to contact any other earth
terminal without passing through an
intervening earth terminal.
The EHF related features described here
will be combined with more conventional
UHF features and perhaps some SHF
capability. The combined spacecraft will
be designed for shuttle/IUS launch in the
latter part of this decade. A constellaof approximately four to six
spacecraft will provide the necessary
worldwide coverage.

Probably the most critical hardware item
under development is the EHF transmitter
which will operate in the 20 GH2 band on
board the satellite. A large percentage
of communications satellite failures in
the recent past have been attributed to
transmitter failures. This is
particularly true in the higher frequency
bands where only Traveling Wave Tube
Amplifiers (TWTAs) were capable of
providing the required output power. The
military experience with TWTAs has been
less than satisfactory. To date we have
been unable to obtain TWTAs with long-term
reliability commensurate with the
reliability of other spacecraft
components. This has made the desired ten
year lifetime difficult to achieve. Solid
State technology is now reaching a level
of maturity where it can compete with
TWTAs at the lower power levels. Solid
State transmitters show promise of
significantly higher long-term reliability
than TWTAs. Solid State transmitters are
not without there own set of faults,
however. The low efficiency of the
current Solid State transmitter designs
requires much more spacecraft prime power
than equivalent TWTA designs and also

TECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE MILSATCOM SYSTEMS

The preceding description of a new
generation MILSATCOM system with a
substantial increase in capability may
seem like a lot of wishful thinking. Even
with the advancements that we have seen in
electronic technology, these capabilities
are a radical departure from the
capabilities of today's systems. We might
be concerned that the state of technology
may not be ready to support such an
advanced system. In fact, all of the
major technologies needed to implement
such a system have been demonstrated or
are now under development.
The Lincoln Experimental Satellites 8 and
9 demonstrated the feasibility of several
new technologies including the use of EHF
for satellite communications and satellite
to satellite crosslinks. A LASER
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another approach is indicated.

presents some difficult thermal
dissipation problems, particularly at the
higher frequencies.(9)
Because the TWTA and Solid State
technologies each have advantages to
consider, we are proceeding with
development of EHF power amplifiers in
both areas. We are currently developing
an advanced TWTA for operation in the
This development is a joint
20GH Z band.
effort with NASA Lewis Research Center
which will produce a proof of concept dual
mode tube capable of linear operation at
either oftwo output power levels lOdb apart,
This tube would normally operate at 2.5
watts but could be commanded to operate at
25 watts when higher power is required.
We are also developing two types of solid
state power amplifiers in the 20GHZ band.
The first type uses IMPATT diodes as a low
risk approach to achieve 20-25 watts of
saturated power output. The second type
uses GaAs Field Effect Transistors (FET)
to achieve a linear output. This type is
currently capable of about half the power
of the IMPATT type and is viewed as a
higher risk venture. At present we are in
device development and expect to begin
GaAs FET transmitter development in 1982.
The engineering of Solid State transmitters
differs from the engineering of TWTA
transmitters because the combined output
of several Solid State amplifiers is
needed to equal the ouput of one TWTA.
The conventional approach to Solid State
transmitter design has been to combine
the output of several amplifiers in a
resonant cavity, or other similar circuit,
and then feed an antenna in the same
manner as a TWTA would. As we move into
the EHF frequencies the physical size of
these circuits becomes increasingly small.
Because the efficiency of the devices is
also decreasing as the frequency
increases, the thermal gradient and heat
dissapation problem becomes severe. If we
are to achieve an output power comparable
with that obtainable from a TWTA at EHF,

4-50

One approach is to place an amplifier
behind each element of a phased array
antenna. The output power is thereby
combined in the far field of the antenna.
This approach reduces the thermal gradient
problem by dispersing the heat sources.
It also raises overall efficiency of the
transmitter by lowering the combining
losses. Finally, this approach leads to a
graceful degradation upon failure, since
the loss of an element only slightly
reduces the effective output power.
Another critical item of hardware under
development is the laser crosslink system
(LASERCOM). The LASERCOM system, which is
capable of handling a Giga Bit per second
data rate, is ideally suited for the
satellite to satellite crosslink
application and under favorable
conditions, can be used for satellite to
aircraft or even satellite to ground
applications. Aircraft to aircraft
communications by LASERCOM could also be
handled using a relay satellite.
We have recently completed a series of
field test of the LASERCOM system at White
Sands, New Mexico. A high data rate
LASERCOM transceiver was installed in a
KC135 aircraft and a similar unit was
installed in a ground facility at Cowan
site on the White Sands Missile Range.
These tests fully demonstrated the
capabilities of the LASERCOM system in a
dynamic environment. Acquisition and
tracking were demonstrated under
conditions far more severe than those
found in space. In addition, some
atmospheric and propagation effects were
studied. The tests were highly successful
indicating that the technology for space
laser communications is mature and ready
for operational deployment.
WHERE DO WE 60 FROM HERE

We have shown that all the critical pieces

of technology needed for the next
generation tactical satellite
communications system have been
demonstrated. What remains to be done is
the integrate of that technology into a
system and convince the Congress that the
system merits development and deployment.
To do so we must demonstrate that the DOD
finally has its act together in the
MILSATCOM arena. This is a task that
cannot be accomplished by the
technologists alone.

(September 1976)
6. Lt General W.L. Creech "Remarks of the
Workshop," Decision Information for
Tactical Command and Control, Robert M.
Thrall et. al. ed, Houston, Texas
(September 1976)
7. Jack D. Ripper was the SAC commander
who initiated a nuclear attack without
authority in Doctor Strangelove, Charles
Forbin was the computer expert who
designed the super computer that would
automatically make all national decisions
in Colossus, The Forbin Project.

Whole new concepts for the conduct of
tactical warfare need development. We,
once again, have a situation where
technology is racing ahead of operational
concepts. We must avoid Maginot Line
thinking. The operational concepts for
the use of satellite communications
systems at the turn of the millenium must
be consistent with the operational
concepts for the employment of new weapons
systems in that time period. Finally,we
must present an integrated system,
responsive to the needs of all the
services.

8. D.R. McElroy and R.L. Eaves "EHF
System for Mobile Users," AIAA, Orlando,
Florida (April 1980)
9. Lt M.J. Schwene "Advanced Space
Communications - Developing Technology
Today to Meet Tommorrow's Military
Communications Needs,"Signal, February
1981, pp. 43-45
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